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Abstract:  
In 1924, Deguchi OŶisaďuƌō, head of the JapaŶese ƌeligioŶ, Ōŵoto, skipped ďail to flee to 
Manchuria, where he joined a Mongolian bandit by the name of Lu Zhankui on an armed 
expedition into Inner Mongolia. However, the mission ended in collapse, with Lu shot and 
Deguchi sent back to Japan in shackles.  
The expedition is an example of practical Pan-Asianism. Because it has typically been 
studied as a political idea, an instance of Pan-Asianism on-the-ground offers new ways of 
studying the ideology. In particular the case shines a light on the ͞continental adventurers͟, 
a critical group of Japanese active in Manchuria who were vital links in the ͞colonial 
realities͟ of JapaŶ͛s iŶfoƌŵal empire.  
The article adopts a transnational methodology, arguing that this offers a wider possibility 
for the study of Pan-Asianism: enabling the recognition of the tensions inherent within the 
ideology without seeking to reduce them to a ͞paƌadoǆ͟. 
Keywords: Transnational History, Japan, Pan-Asianism, Ōŵoto, MoŶgolia, MaŶchuria, 
Japanese Empire  
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Introduction1 
On the morning of 8th February 1924, the charismatic Japanese religious leader Deguchi 
OŶisaďuƌō (出口王仁三郎) was smuggled out of Japan, where he had been under house 
arrest since 1921, charged with lèse-majesté against the Imperial family.2 From Kyoto he 
travelled with three followers, out of the country and across Korea into Manchuria. By the 
15th of February he had reached the town of Fengtian.3 That night, in a secret location and 
still under cover due to the official Japanese presence in Manchuria, he met Lu Zhankui (盧
占魁), a Manchurian-Mongolian soldier, for the first time. Theirs was an unlikely alliance – 
DeguĐhi͛s spiƌitual ŵissioŶ aŶd pƌofessioŶs of paĐifisŵ ǁere Ŷot aŶ oďǀious ŵatĐh foƌ Lu͛s 
past as a bandit-cum-independence fighter, and they had no common language.4 However, 
the Japanese ͞continental adventurers͟ who brought them together had obviously seen 
some potential – with the aid of an interpreter the two men hit it off and Deguchi joined Lu 
on a mission launched by the local Chinese warlord, Zhang Zuolin (張作霖), that rode out 
into Inner Mongolia with two thousand soldiers.  
The objectives that were projected onto this expedition (known from the Japanese 
perspective as the NǇūŵō, 入蒙, the ͞entry into Mongolia͟Ϳ were manifold – to act as a 
strategic bulwark in the struggles between different Chinese factions, to spread a religious 
                                                             
1 I would like to express my thanks to the editors of the Journal of Northeast Asian History, and the reviewers, 
for their help with this article. 
2 Li Narangoa, ͞Universal Values and Pan-Asianism: The Vision of Omotokyo͟, in Pan-Asianism in Modern 
Japanese History: Colonialism, Regionalism and Borders, ed. by V Koschmann and S Saaler (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2007), p.59 
3 Contemporary Shengyan, Fengtian (奉天) ǁas kŶoǁŶ ďǇ the JapaŶese as HōteŶ, aŶd ŵost ĐoŵŵoŶlǇ iŶ the 
West as Mukden. 
4 According to Deguchi, they relied upon an interpreter and, at times, on the ͞brushtalk͟ of written Chinese 
(Deguchi OŶisaďuƌō, DeguĐhi OŶisaďurō ZeŶshū, Voluŵe 6: Nyūŵōki, (Ayabe: Tenseisha, 1998) p.51, p.189) 
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message, to create an independent Inner Mongolia, to liberate Outer Mongolia from 
communism, even to search for hidden treasure.5 However, after several months in the 
saddle, it was to end in ignominy. Lu, along with his core subordinates, was shot by his 
erstwhile sponsor, Zhang Zuolin, ǁhilst the otheƌ ďaŶdits ǁho had joiŶed Lu͛s Đause ŵelted 
back into their previous lives. Deguchi and the other Japanese who had accompanied him 
were reportedly only rescued from the firing squad by the intervention of Japanese consular 
officials, who described Deguchi weeping tears of joy at the news that he was to be 
returned to Japan to stand trial.6 
OŶ oŶe leǀel, the aĐĐouŶt of DeguĐhi͛s ŵissioŶ to IŶŶeƌ MoŶgolia is aŶ adǀeŶtuƌe stoƌǇ – the 
tale of an audacious expedition that ended in disaster, an expensive and tragic fiasco. But at 
the same time it represents a case study of Pan-Asianism in action. The historiography of 
Japanese Pan-Asian movements prior to the launch of the Second World War has tended to 
see them through the lens of political philosophy and lobbying, but examples of the 
ideology put into actual practice on-the-ground are rather rarer.7 Thus this case offers the 
chance to map the complex networks of intellectual and social connections between various 
Japanese groups and their continental allies, exploring the everyday on-the-ground realities 
of JapaŶ͛s gƌoǁiŶg eŶgagiŶg iŶ ChiŶa. 
In particular, the Mongolian expedition casts a light on the ͞tairiku rōŶiŶ͟ (大陸浪人), or 
͞ĐoŶtiŶeŶtal adǀeŶtuƌeƌs͟: a shadowy group of Japanese adventurers who are revealed as a 
vital glue between Chinese and Japanese interests. This article argues that they deserve 
                                                             
5 J.G. Boyd, ͞Faith, Race and Strategy: Japanese-Mongolian Relations, 1873-1945͟, (Murdoch University, 2008), 
pp.186-188 
6 ͞Kuƌoŵaki ha Yoďi-Taisa͟, Osaka Mainichi Shinbun, 2nd July 1924 
7 One counter example to this is the early attempt by the Japanese to support a popular rebellion in the 
Philippines, see Marius B Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat-Sen, (Stanford University Press, 1970), pp.68-74 
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greater scrutiny for their capacity to reveal a deeper understanding of Pan-Asianism as a 
practice as well as an ideology. 
The article examines the Mongolian expedition from inception to execution to its downfall, 
and its subsequent contested interpretation, exploring the different motives and meanings 
embedded within it. After examining three perspectives – how the mission came together, 
what happened, and then how it was reinterpreted after its end – the article revisits the 
scholarship on Pan-Asianism, arguing that the transnational methodology mobilized to study 
the NǇūŵō ƌepƌeseŶts aŶ alteƌŶatiǀe ǁaǇ of approaching Pan-Asianism, one that recognizes 
the tensions inherent within Pan-Asian coalitions without reducing them to a ͞paradox͟, or 
privileging one reading over another.   
Deguchi, Lu, and Zhang 
Transnational events are, by their very definition, the coming together of multiple different 
groups or individuals, each with their own perspectives and motivations. While we often 
concentrate on the common ground that they made possible, these links are nevertheless 
ĐoŵŵoŶalities fouŶd ǁithiŶ diffeƌeŶĐe. The NǇūŵō ǁas aŶ eǆaŵple of a tƌaŶsŶatioŶal 
event par excellence: the two main protagonists brought very different perspectives to the 
expedition they engaged on together, and yet they were able to make common cause. 
Examining the different motives and hopes which were written into the Mongolian 
expedition at its outset, by Deguchi, Lu and others, reveals a complex set of different visions 
embedded into a network of social relationships, demonstrating how Pan-Asianism was 
itself embedded into the realities of the Japanese imperial presence in Asia from its very 
outset.  
 6 
Fiƌst DeguĐhi OŶisaďuƌō. DeguĐhi ǁas the seĐoŶd leadeƌ of the “hiŶto-based religion, 
Ōŵoto, ǁhiĐh had ƌiseŶ fƌoŵ ƌuƌal ƌoots iŶ ǁesteƌŶ JapaŶ to ďeĐoŵe the laƌgest of the 
Japanese ͞new͟ religions.8 Deguchi was a charismatic leader whose message went beyond 
the ƌeligioŶ͛s iŶitial appeal to those disadǀaŶtaged JapaŶese ŵodeƌŶization to attract ͞an 
aŵaziŶg ŵultitude of… all Đlasses, ͞patƌioteeƌs͟, ŵegaloŵaŶiaĐs, eaƌŶest seekeƌs… 
especially from the ranks of the retired officers of the army and navy.͟9 Indeed, Deguchi was 
so successful and his reluctance to submit to state regulation such that, in 1921, the 
goǀeƌŶŵeŶt ŵoǀed to suppƌess Ōŵoto, peƌĐeiǀiŶg its gƌoǁiŶg ǀoiĐe as a thƌeat to the 
domestic order.10 The state seized assets, destroyed property, and arrested key leaders, 
ĐhaƌgiŶg DeguĐhi aŶd soŵe otheƌs ǁith Đƌiŵes ƌelated to Ōŵoto͛s oǁŶeƌship of a ŶatioŶal 
newspaper, the Taishō Nichinichi Shimbun (大正日日新聞).11  
In response to this suppression, Deguchi made some efforts to reform the religion, replacing 
practices and texts which the state perceived as problematic and launching what has 
ďeĐoŵe kŶoǁŶ as Ōŵoto͛s iŶteƌŶatioŶal phase. PeƌseĐuted aŶd disĐƌedited at hoŵe, the 
religion turned abroad to seek succor, forging connections with religions across Asia, 
engaging with the international language Esperanto, and opening an office in Paris.12 
The NǇūŵō theŶ ǁas a paƌt of DeguĐhi͛s atteŵpt to fiŶd a Ŷeǁ souƌĐe of legitiŵaĐǇ iŶ the 
face of domestic assault, running from the shadow of prosecution in Japan and seeking to 
                                                             
8 Foƌ aŶ oǀeƌǀieǁ of Ōŵoto͛s histoƌǇ, see Thomas Nadolski, ͞The Socio-Political Background of the 1921 and 
ϭϵϯϱ Ōŵoto “uppƌessioŶs iŶ JapaŶ͟, (University of Pennsylvania, 1975); or Nancy K Stalker, Prophet Motive: 
DeguĐhi OŶisaďurō, Ooŵoto, aŶd the Rise of Neǁ ReligioŶs iŶ Iŵperial JapaŶ, (University of Hawaii Press, 
2008). 
9 Kenneth Saunders, ͞Glimpses of the Religious Life of New Japan͟, The Journal of Religion, 2 (1922), p.76 
10 A ŵoƌe ĐoŵpƌeheŶsiǀe aĐĐouŶt of Ōŵoto͛s Đoŵpleǆ ƌelatioŶship to the state͛s ƌegulatoƌǇ fƌaŵeǁoƌk is 
contained within Sheldon M Garon, ͞State and Religion in Imperial Japan, 1912-1945͟, Journal of Japanese 
Studies, (1986). 
11 Stalker, Prophet Motive, p.97-99 
12 Ibid. pp.99-101, p.148 
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promote efforts at international expansion. However, what exactly Deguchi hoped to 
achieve in Manchuria is less clear. Whilst he produced an account of the expedition, this 
must be read carefully as a text, recognizing it as an attempt to justify the mission to his 
followers in the light of its collapse. 13 Holding this in mind, we can nevertheless still read it 
as a rich account of Deguchi͛s ǀieǁs of the ŵissioŶ. He suggested that his aims were:  
to go where people do not go... to make clear to the world the great spirit 
of the Japanese nation and to show the world, far and wide, the peerless 
majesty of the unbroken imperial line. Moreover [to show] that the spirit 
of the Japanese nation is not conquest, is not aggression, but to guide the 
peoples of the nations of the world to the path of the gods, by means of 
the power of the beautiful and virtuous language. To rule the people of 
the world, military force and intellect are useless; ultimately it will be 
spiritual union. Only new religions, unencumbered by the old customs, 
have the power. 14 
A visiting card Deguchi carried with him in Mongolia offers some corroboration not coloured 
by hindsight. On it, he laid claim to a variety of religious identities – as leadeƌ of Ōŵoto, of 
course, but also ties to the ͞fiǀe Chinese religions͟ (中国五大教), FukakǇō ;a Korean new 
                                                             
13 DeguĐhi͛s account was first published in early 1925, the year after he had returned to Japan. He published it 
with the title ŌŶi Mōko Iri Ki ;AŶ AĐĐouŶt of OŶi[saďuƌō]͛s MoŶgoliaŶ TƌipͿ usiŶg the pseudoŶǇŵ UeŶo KōeŶ. 
It was later amended and republished, this time as a part of the Reikai Monogatari, a vast religious text that 
Deguchi dictated to followers in the years either side of the mission. This paper uses a copy of the Rekai 
Monogatari version of the account. However, various passages of the original ŌŶi Mōko Iri version are 
available in Ōŵoto͛s iŶteƌŶal histoƌǇ ;Ōŵoto NaŶajūŶeŶ “hi HeŶsaŶkai, Ōŵoto NaŶajūŶeŶ Shi, (Kyoto: 
Ōŵoto, ϭϵϲϰͿ), in Deguchi KǇōtaƌō͛s ďiogƌaphǇ of OŶisaďuƌō ;Deguchi KǇōtaƌō, KyojiŶ: DeguĐhi OŶisaďurō, 
(Kodansha, 1975)) and elsewhere. Examination of these excerpts reveals that they are in almost all cases 
word for word matches for the later version used in this paper. 
14 Deguchi, DeguĐhi OŶisaďurō Zenshū, p.38 
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religion,普化教), and the titles Dalai Lama and ͞Susano Khan͟, as well as Chairman of the 
Society For The Spread Of World Language (i.e. Esperanto).15 Whilst the liŶk to FukakǇō ǁas 
reportedly a means of skirting a ban on Japanese religious missionary activity in Manchuria, 
the others reveal a syncretic attitude to religious allegiance, and an approach that fused 
Asian (and international) identity.  
Whilst this is somewhat fuzzy, cast in the evocative language of the new religion, the broad 
aiŵ seeŵs to haǀe ďeeŶ to ĐoŶtiŶue to eǆpaŶd Ōŵoto͛s ďase of suppoƌt to ĐoŶstitueŶĐies 
beyond the Japanese homeland and potentially even to establish some form of religious 
community in the space of northern China. This latter aim seems superficially unlikely, and 
ǁith the ǁisdoŵ of hiŶdsight, eǀeŶ foolhaƌdǇ, ďut iŶ the ĐoŶteǆt of Taishō eƌa JapaŶ it can 
be read alongside other experimental communities such as the Atarashiki Mura, Arashima 
Takeo͛s liďeƌated faƌŵ, and (later) MiǇazaǁa KeŶji͛s ‘asuĐhijiŶ AssoĐiatioŶ. These were each 
an attempt to form a real community grounded in a set of philosophical ideas. Whilst they 
ǁeƌe ďased aƌouŶd the JapaŶese ǀillage aŶd DeguĐhi͛s ŵissioŶ took plaĐe iŶ MoŶgolia, 
drawing on Pan-Asian ideas, nevertheless there is a thread of continuity between them. 
DeguĐhi͛s aiŵs ǁeƌe unlikely perhaps and even grandiose, then, but not unprecedented.16  
Running from persecution at home, and carrying an idiosyncratic vision of Asian religious 
union, Deguchi landed in the midst of a complex and unstable setting, in which his partner-
to-be Lu Zhankui was only a minor player. Manchuria in the early 1920s was an uneasy 
borderland between different powers. The warlord Zhang Zuolin controlled the area but had 
to deal with both the Japanese and the Russians, through their respective railway 
                                                             
15 Kazuaki Deguchi, OŶisaďurō Nyūŵō Hiǁa, (Idzutomidzu, 1985), p.79 
16 Angela Yiu, ͞Atarashikimura: The IŶtelleĐtual aŶd LiteƌaƌǇ CoŶteǆts of a Taishō UtopiaŶ Village͟, Nichibunken 
Japan Review, (2008). Notably the Atarashiki Mura continues to the present day.  
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concessions. Moreover, the factional struggles that had rolled over China since the fall of 
the Qing government in 1911 meant that there was a shifting series of rivals, allies and 
enemies to the south. Zhang͛s FeŶgtiaŶ ĐliƋue had shaƌed ĐoŶtƌol oǀeƌ BeijiŶg ďetǁeeŶ 
1920 and 1922 together with Cao Kun (曹錕), at the head of the Zhili (直隷) faction. 
However, their alliance broke down and Zhang͛s aƌŵies ǁeƌe seŶt iŶto ƌetƌeat. BaĐk iŶ 
Manchuria, he had begun to rebuild, preparing for a new round of conflict.17  
Despite the presence of Russia and Japan, Manchuria represented a fairly strategically 
advantageous base. The key threats from other warlords were concentrated to the south 
through a relatively narrow corridor bounded by the sea and by mountains. The only 
potential risk of a second flank came via Inner Mongolia. As a consequence of this, Inner 
Mongolia was a site of significant strategic importance in the early 1920s. To complicate 
matters further, Outer Mongolia had declared independence in 1911 after the collapse of 
the Qing, eventually falling under the control of Communist forces supported by the Soviet 
Union. Zhang Zuolin, then, wanted to fill the vacuum in Inner Mongolia before his rivals did 
so, plug a strategic gap, potentially recruit more troops from the region, and ultimately even 
perhaps look towards expelling the communists from Urga to the north.  
The man Zhang selected in order to pursue these goals was Lu Zhankui. Lu was a 
soldier/bandit of mixed Manchurian and Mongolian heritage, who had been involved in 
previous military endeavors in Inner Mongolia, most notably an ill-fated attempt at 
                                                             
17 Gavan McCormack, Chang Tso Lin in Northeast China, 1911-1928 : China, Japan and the Manchurian Idea, 
(Folkestone: Dawson, 1978), p.62 et seq. 
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independence by a Mongolian prince, Babojab (巴布扎布), in 1916.18 After the failure of 
that mission, Lu threw his lot in with Zhang Zuolin, remaining in Fengtian until Zhang looked 
to him to secure his Mongolian flank. Zhang͛s plaŶ ǁas, in the first instance, to station as 
many as 7,000 troops in the strategically important space, uŶdeƌ Lu͛s ĐoŶtƌol, ǁith a ǀieǁ to 
expanding the mission as it developed.19 Whilst Lu accepted the commission from Zhang, 
and seemed to welcome the chance to get back out into the saddle after time spent kicking 
his heels in Fengtian, he perhaps also harboured goals of reviving the dream of Inner 
Mongolian autonomy alongside his direct orders.20  
Colonial realities and the Tairiku Rōnin 
The ease with which Deguchi went from life at home in Kyoto prefecture to joining a band of 
Mongolian soldiers on the steppes of North-East Asia is indicative of the connection 
between Japanese daily life & society and the very limits of Japanese continental influence. 
Manchuria and Mongolia were at once a distant, alien and yet romantic borderland and, at 
the same time, also geographically close and integrally connected to Japanese society. 
Likewise, whilst Deguchi and Lu were very different figures with different backgrounds and 
motivations, their meeting did not occur by chance: it was brokered by a set of 
intermediaries, the ͞Continental Adventurers͟. Known in Japanese as the Tairiku RōŶiŶ, or 
the ShiŶa RōŶiŶ, these were a loose set of Japanese, usually ex-soldiers, who were active in 
various ways on the Asian continent. Their position – on the margins of the Mongolian 
                                                             
18 Japan Center for Asian Historical Records, JACAR.or.jp, B Series (Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs). Ref. B03050190400, ͞Rō SeŶ Kai Ŷo KōdōŶi kaŶ suru keŶ”, p.15; For some background on the 
Babojab incident, see McCormack, Chang Tso Lin, pp.28-30. 
19 McCormack, Chang Tso Lin, pp.118-119 
20 Gojū TōjiŶ, ͞Yuŵe No Mōko Ōkoku͟, in Taiyō, November December 1924, January 1925. Pt.2 p.208 
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mission yet integral in getting it off the ground – reflects accurately their broader position in 
the Japanese informal empire. Whilst they have been somewhat overlooked, they occupied 
a vital role in between the various different Japanese factions and the locals, linking Japan 
and China, and bringing their own visions of Asian unity with them.  
The fiƌst of these adǀeŶtuƌeƌs to ďƌiŶg MaŶĐhuƌia to DeguĐhi͛s atteŶtioŶ ǁas HiŶo TsuǇoshi 
(日野強). Hino was a Russo-Japanese War veteran who remained on the continent after his 
service as an explorer. He was best known for the account of a trip he made across China 
and the Himalayas into India, Iri Kiko (ʰ伊犂紀行ʱ).21 Back in Japan, Hino reportedly 
ƌegaled DeguĐhi ǁith tales fƌoŵ his oǁŶ adǀeŶtuƌes, pushiŶg hiŵ to take Ōŵoto͛s ŵessage 
overseas.22 
Hino died in 1920, before any concrete opportunity presented itself, so it was another two 
continental adventurers who were most directly involved in convincing Deguchi to leave 
Kyoto. Their names were YaŶo Yūtaƌō (矢野祐太郎) and Okasaki Tesshu (岡崎鉄首), and 
both were ex-soldiers based in Manchuria: YaŶo aŶ aƌŵs tƌadeƌ iŶ FeŶgtiaŶ aŶd aŶ Ōŵoto 
follower, and Okasaki linked to printing activities for Zhang Zuolin͛s aƌŵies.23 BǇ DeguĐhi͛s 
account, Okasaki in particular was a boisterous figure, berating those about him regularly 
and serving as a symbol of the aggressive Japanese stance towards China.24 
                                                             
21 Nadolski, ͞The Socio-Political BaĐkgƌouŶd of the Ōŵoto “uppƌessioŶs͟, p.127; Tsuyoshi Hino, Iri Kikō, ;FuǇō 
“hoďō, ϭϵϳϯͿ. 
22 Stalker, Propher Motive, p.147. 
23 Gojū, ͞Yuŵe No Mōko Ōkoku͟. pt.3 p.210; Michihito Tsushima, ͞Emperor and World Renewal in the New 
Religions: The Case of Shinsei Ryûjinkai͟, Contemporary Papers on Japanese Religions, 2: New Religions 
(1991). 
24 Deguchi, DeguĐhi OŶisaďurō Zenshū, pp.84-5 
 12 
The continental adventurers occupy a fairly marginal position in the historiography of 
JapaŶ͛s ĐoloŶial pƌeseŶĐe oŶ the AsiaŶ ŵaiŶlaŶd: uŶoffiĐial, aŶd ofteŶ aĐtiŶg iŶ a clandestine 
fashion on behalf of the Japanese army, they left little concrete documentary trace – what 
stories do remain often make more for conspiracy theory and rumor than solid history. 
However, they were an integral part of the growing Japanese presence in Manchuria and 
surrounding regions, forming an invisible web of connections between the various groups of 
military and civilian, Japanese, Chinese and others – the ͞colonial realities͟ of JapaŶ͛s 
informal empire. 25  
That the adventurers embraced the name ͞ƌōŶiŶ͟ was no coincidence: they saw themselves 
as the spiritual descendants of the Shishi, the Bakuŵatsu eƌa ƌōŶiŶ ;ƌeŶegade saŵuƌaiͿ ǁho 
had agitated for pro-Emperor and anti-Western causes.26 The continental adventurers 
aimed to bring the lessons of the Meiji Ishin to wider Asia. They were active on two fronts: 
on the continent, in their role as conduits between different factions, and at home, where 
they engaged in political pressure through the ͞patriotic͟ or ͞political associations͟. The 
best known of these weƌe the GeŶ͛Ǉōsha (玄洋社) aŶd the KokuƌǇūkai (黒龍会): they form 
the bulk of our understanding of these figures and their role in Japanese Pan-Asianism. 
Whilst the continental adventurers were often acting in secret in Manchuria, the patriotic 
associations conducted much of their business entirely in the open.27  
                                                             
25 The phrase ͞colonial realities͟ is from Yoshihisa Tak Matsusaka, The Making of Japanese Manchuria, 1904-
1932, (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Asia Center, 2001); another concept that is 
helpful in thinking about the rich and direct connections between Japan and its presence on the continent is 
Louise YouŶg͛s ͞Total Empire͟, Louise Young, Japan's Total Empire : Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime 
Imperialism, (Berkeley : University of California Press, 1998). 
26 E. Herbert Norman, ͞The Genyosha: A Study in the Origins of Japanese Imperialism͟, Pacific Affairs, 17 
(1944), p.263-4 
27 Foƌ eǆaŵple, GaǀaŶ MĐCoƌŵaĐk͚s studǇ of Zhang Zuolin notes the difficulty in really tracking the activities of 
even the official advisors embedded in Chinese factions (McCormack, Chang Tso Lin, pp.119-124), whereas 
“ǀeŶ “aaleƌ is aďle to tƌaĐe the KokuƌǇūkai from their public magazines (Sven Saaler, ͞The KokuƌǇūkai ;BlaĐk 
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Sven Saaler notes that the associations lacked a particularly wide social base, and so tended 
to operate as a political lobby rather than a mass movement in Japan, seeking to influence 
politics through a variety of means – culturing networks of contacts, writing memoranda 
and newspaper articles, and even using menace and threat.28 However, paying closer 
attention to the adventurers͛ activities in north-eastern China through events such as the 
NǇūŵō opeŶs up aŶotheƌ diŵeŶsioŶ to theiƌ aĐtiǀitǇ: iŶflueŶĐiŶg the pƌaĐtiĐal Ŷatuƌe of 
JapaŶ͛s pƌeseŶĐe iŶ ChiŶa, ŵediatiŶg ďetǁeeŶ ǀaƌious diffeƌeŶt gƌoups aŶd eǆteŶdiŶg the 
ŵilitaƌǇ͛s iŶfoƌŵal reach.   
Scholarship, from the Second World War onwards, has marked these figures and the 
patriotic societies they formed as ultranationalist, noting the uncompromising approaches 
they took in trying to promote Japanese expansion.29 However, the portrayal of them as 
ardent Japanese nationalists is complicated by the relative ease with they found partners 
from Asia – foƌ eǆaŵple, KokuƌǇūkai liŶks to the IlĐhiŶhoe ;一進會, 일진회) in pre-
aŶŶeǆatioŶ Koƌea, oƌ leadeƌs UĐhida ‘Ǉōhei aŶd TōǇaŵa Mitsuru's associations with Sun 
Yat-sen.30 This highlights a tension inherent within turn of the century Pan-Asianism 
identified by Christopher Szpilman: ͞Japanese Pan-Asianism was a contradictory doctrine.... 
it was anti-Western, but was partly inspired by Western writings; though it promoted 
                                                             
Dragon Society) and the Rise of Nationalism, Pan-Asianism, and Militarism in Japan, 1901-1925͟, International 
Journal of Asian Studies, 11 (2014)). 
28 Sven Saaler, ͞Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History͟, in Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: 
Colonialism, Regionalism and Borders, ed. by Sven Saaler and J Victor Koschmann (Routledge, 2007), p.14-15, 
and Sven Saaler, ͞The KokuƌǇūkai aŶd the ‘ise of NatioŶalisŵ͟, pp.134-137. 
29 “ee HilaƌǇ CoŶƌoǇ, The JapaŶese Seizure of Korea, ϭϴ6ϴ-ϭϵϭϬ : A Study of Realisŵ aŶd Idealisŵ iŶ 
IŶterŶatioŶal RelatioŶs, ;Philadelphia: Philadelphia : UŶiǀeƌsitǇ of PeŶŶsǇlǀaŶia Pƌess, ϭϵϲϬͿ, NoƌŵaŶ, ͞The 
GeŶǇosha ,͟ aŶd JaŶseŶ, The JapaŶese aŶd SuŶ Yat-SeŶ. The KokuƌǇūkai ;͞BlaĐk DƌagoŶ “oĐietǇ͟Ϳ aŶd the 
GeŶ͛Ǉōsha ;͞Daƌk OĐeaŶ “oĐietǇ͟Ϳ ǁeƌe ďoth Ŷaŵed afteƌ geogƌaphiĐal ŵaƌkeƌs of Asia: the Aŵuƌ ƌiǀeƌ oŶ the 
ChiŶa/“iďeƌia ďoƌdeƌ & the sea ďetǁeeŶ JapaŶ aŶd Koƌea ƌespeĐtiǀelǇ. 
30 Eri Hotta, Pan-Asianism and Japan's War 1931-1945, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), Prasenjit Duara, ͞The 
Discourse of Civilization and Pan-Asianism͟, Journal of World History, 12 (2001), p.112; Jansen, The Japanese 
and Sun Yat-Sen. 
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egalitarianism Asian brotherhood, it insisted on Japanese superiority.͟31 The continental 
adventurers were at the cutting edge of this tension, and so it is important that we pay 
closer attention to them and their actions.  
Whilst Deguchi and Lu were the most prominent faces of the Mongolian expedition, the 
continental adventurers were important participants as well, and they also brought their 
own idealistic dimension to the mission. This is best seen through one of the smaller 
patƌiotiĐ assoĐiatioŶs, the Chōkokukai (肇国会). The Chōkokukai was an offshoot of the likes 
of the GeŶ͛Ǉōsha aŶd the KokuƌǇūkai which existed to advocate for the establishment of an 
idealized Asian state & society in North-East Asia, covering parts of Manchuria, Siberia, 
Mongolia, and Korea.32 The state ǁas to ďe Đalled Gƌeat Kōƌai ;大高麗, after the ancient 
Korean kingdom Goryeo) and it was the idea of Suenaga Misao (末永節), a Japanese 
scholar.  
“ueŶaga͛s fiƌst ǁoƌk ǁas a ϭϵϭϳ tƌeatise eŶtitled ͞China is already a failed state͟(ʰ支那ͺ
すでに亡国せりʱ), which argued that Japan had a pressing need to act to protect the 
people of China from the vacuum created by the failure of the Chinese government.33 In 
ĐoŶtƌast ǁith this faiƌlǇ ƌealist appƌoaĐh, Gƌeat Kōƌai ǁas, ǁhilst ŵotiǀated ďǇ siŵilaƌ 
concerns, a much more idealistic, utopian vision. Suenaga proposed a multiethnic state 
taking the rough shape of a bird with spread wings, ruled in accordance with a mix of 
                                                             
31 Chƌistopheƌ WA “zpilŵaŶ, ͞BetǁeeŶ PaŶ-AsiaŶisŵ aŶd NatioŶalisŵ. Mitsukaǁa Kaŵetaƌô aŶd His CaŵpaigŶ 
to ‘efoƌŵ JapaŶ aŶd Liďeƌate Asia ,͟ iŶ PaŶ-AsiaŶisŵ iŶ ModerŶ JapaŶese History: ColoŶialisŵ, RegioŶalisŵ 
aŶd Borders, ed. ďǇ “ǀeŶ “aaleƌ aŶd J ViĐtoƌ KosĐhŵaŶŶ ;‘outledge, ϮϬϬϳͿ, pp. ϴϳ-ϭϬϬ., p.ϴϱ 
32 Yuichi Hasegawa, ͞Taishō Chūki Taiƌiku Kokka He No Iŵe-Ji: ͞Dai-Kōƌaikoku͟ Kōsō to “oŶo “hūheŶ͟, Kokusai 
Seiji, #71 (August) (1982). 
33 KokuƌǇūkai, Tōa SeŶkaku Shishi KideŶ, (Tokyo, 1936), p.21 
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different Asian traditions and principles including communal ownership of land and racial 
equality.34 “ueŶaga͛s pƌoposal ƌeĐeiǀed its fiƌst puďliĐ aƌtiĐulatioŶ thƌough Ōŵoto͛s 
newspaper, the Taisho Nichinichi Shinbun.35 An even more direct connection to the mission 
was the figure of Okasaki Tesshu, one of the participants on the expedition mentioned 
earlier, ǁho ǁas a pƌoŵiŶeŶt ŵeŵďeƌ of the Chōkokukai.36  
Deguchi, then, arrived in Fengtian to find a coalition of different groups – Zhang eager to 
shore up his northern flank, Lu harboring dreams of independence back out on the steppe, 
and the continental adventurers with their complex vision of Japanese leadership and Pan-
Asian alliance. Photographs of the start of the expedition reveal the men in high spirits, 
eager to get out on the road.37 In March 1924, two of the continental adventurers (Yano 
Yutaƌō aŶd Ōishi ‘ǇōͿ ƌeŵaiŶed iŶ FeŶgtiaŶ to ĐooƌdiŶate supplies, ǁhilst DeguĐhi, Okasaki, 
and three other Japanese who had accompanied Deguchi from Kyoto, set out to the north.38 
The NǇūŵō froŵ Outside and In 
Lu and Deguchi departed from Fengtian separately, apparently to keep their alliance from 
coming to wider attention. 39 Deguchi departed, dressed as a lama, in a pair of cars and 
                                                             
34 Hasegawa, ͞Taishō Chūki Taiƌiku Kokka He No Iŵe-Ji͟, p.95; see also Kimitada Miwa, ͞Pan-Asianism in 
Modern Japan: Nationalism, Regionalism and Universalism͟, in Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History. 
Colonialism, Regionalism and Borders, ed. by Sven Saaler and J. Victor Koschmann (Routledge, 2007), pp. 21-
33. p.27 – this desĐƌiptioŶ doesŶ͛t eǆpliĐitlǇ ƌefeƌeŶĐe “ueŶaga͛s plaŶ, ďut the tiŵiŶg, loĐatioŶ aŶd details 
make it almost certain that it is the same one. 
35 Hasegawa, ͞Taishō Chūki Taiƌiku Kokka He No Iŵe-Ji͟, p.94, fn 6 – the article was published in March 1921, 
shortlǇ afteƌ Ōŵoto had puƌĐhased the Ŷeǁspapeƌ.  
36 Gojū, ͞Yuŵe No Mōko Ōkoku͟. pt. 3, p.208; Ōŵoto NaŶajūŶeŶ Shi. p.729. The Japanese state remained 
iŶteƌested iŶ the Chōkokukai ;aŶd its ƌelatioŶs to ŌŵotoͿ afteƌ the MoŶgoliaŶ eǆpeditioŶ ǁas oǀeƌ (JACAR, 
B03050772200, p.2) 
37 For example, Deguchi, OŶisaďurō Nyūŵō Hiǁa. p.20.  
38 One of the followers who accompanied Deguchi from Japan was Ueshiba Morihei (植芝盛平), who was the 
founder of Aikido. Ōishi ‘Ǉō (大石良) is a less well documented figure, who may have represented a behind 
the scenes connection to the Japanese military.  
39 The pƌeĐise details of DeguĐhi͛s ƌelatioŶship to Zhang and thus his overt connection to the mission are 
unclear: some (e.g. Itō Masao (ed.), GeŶdaishi Shiryō, Vol. ϯϮ: MaŶtetsu Part Ϯ, (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobo, 1966), 
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accompanied by the other Japanese participants. They moved north towards the towns of 
Tongliao (通遼) and Taonan (洮南), at the end of the railway lines which were the lifeblood 
of Manchurian development. From this jumping off point, they continued into Inner 
Mongolia, further north, where they were finally reunited with Lu and his troops. 
Thƌoughout Apƌil, ŵoƌe tƌoops joiŶed the gƌoup aŶd theǇ ƌeloĐated to “ōƌoŶ (索倫), an old 
Russian emplacement.40 EǀeŶtuallǇ theƌe ǁeƌe soŵe ϮϬϬϬ tƌoops uŶdeƌ Lu͛s ĐoŵŵaŶd, 
together with a fluctuating number of Japanese: Deguchi, the followers who had 
accompanied him from Kyoto, and Okasaki Tesshu were permanent residents, while there 
were occasional Japanese visitors from Fengtian, bringing messages, winter clothes and the 
like.41 
 Theƌe is soŵethiŶg of aŶ aďseŶĐe at the heaƌt of the NǇūŵō: ǁhilst the details of the 
protagonists and their motivations is well known, and the aftermath is also well 
documented, what actually took place once they reached Inner Mongolia is much more 
obscure. Photos depict Deguchi, often on a white horse, and clad in a range of outfits, 
interacting with the troops and residents of the Mongolian settlements they visited, as well 
as travelling through the steppe.42 However, there is little in the way of really authoritative 
                                                             
p.272) suggest that Deguchi had Zhang͛s eǆpliĐit appƌoǀal, ǁheƌeas otheƌs iŶdiĐate he oŶlǇ ŵaŶaged this bu 
using a pseudonym, ;͞‘ei Ŷo OŶisaďuƌō͟, Asahi Shinbun, 3rd May 1924). Indeed, the Japanese participants 
began the mission by taking on Chinese names and dress (Ōŵoto NaŶajūŶeŶ Shi. p.733), so it is possible that 
the separate departures of Lu and Deguchi was designed maintain some level of deception.  
40 Itō, Gss Vol.32, p.269 
41 The most detailed estimate for troop numbers comes from JACAR, B03050190400, Kakkoku Naisei Zassan: 
MaŶshū #ϭϰ, p.41 and is higher than some other estimates. This was still significantly short of the original 
plan which called for seven thousand men for the march into Outer Mongolia (Itō, Gss Vol.32. pp.271-2 
͞ChōŶaŶ-ha Shussho Jōhō͟Ϳ 
42 There are a number of photographs from the mission (including an iconic picture of the Japanese members 
of the foƌĐe afteƌ theǇ ǁeƌe ƌesĐued fƌoŵ aƌƌestͿ, DeguĐhi͛s ĐalliŶg Đaƌd disĐussed eaƌlieƌ, aŶd a ŵap of ǁheƌe 
the expedition went over the months they were in the saddle, reportedly drawn by Deguchi soon after the 
mission was over. These are most comprehensively collected in Ōŵoto NaŶajūŶeŶ Shi, chapter 3: ͞ŌŶisaďuƌō 
Ŷi NǇūŵō͟ pp.716-760.  
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detail of the aĐtiǀities of the aƌŵǇ ďeǇoŶd DeguĐhi͛s oǁŶ aĐĐouŶt ǁhiĐh, as disĐussed 
earlier, must be read with some caution. Nevertheless, this relative lack of direct evidence 
can be offset somewhat by a number of external sources which can be read alongside the 
lone internal account. Japanese officials stationed in Manchuria documented events as 
news began to filter back to them, and domestic newspapers too, reported on events (with 
an even greater lag). Together, these various different sources allow some sort of picture of 
DeguĐhi aŶd Lu͛s pƌogƌess oǀeƌ the Đouƌse of the spƌiŶg aŶd suŵŵeƌ. The nature of the 
source base is important because it means that the most pressing question: why the mission 
failed and Zhang Zuolin went from supporting Lu and his men to running them to ground, 
remains hard to answer.  
In mid April, the army received a shipment of arms from Fengtian – some 200 guns, 30,000 
rounds of ammunition, and a number of machine guns, observed by Japanese officials as 
originally marked for Taonan, but routed onwards to Lu.43 At this point the army was 
presumably still supported by Zhang. However, a short time later, Lu changed the name of 
his force from the ͞North-Western Autonomous Army͟ (given to him by Zhang Zuolin) to the 
͞Inner/Outer Mongolian Independence Army͟, also taking up a new banner.44 The decision 
to change name seems to have been a mark of growing independence from his original 
sponsor.  
EǀeŶ ǁithout DeguĐhi͛s pƌeseŶĐe, it is faƌ fƌoŵ Đleaƌ ǁhetheƌ the aƌŵǇ led ďǇ Lu ǁas a 
stable coalition, giǀeŶ Lu͛s pƌioƌ histoƌǇ aŶd the additioŶ of the JapaŶese ĐoŶtiŶeŶtal 
adventurers, but the late addition of the Japanese religious leader was both a symbol of 
                                                             
43 Itō, Gss Vol.32. p.272 
44 Ōŵoto NaŶajūŶeŶ Shi. pp.738-9.  
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competing visions of the expedition and an additional source of potential discord. In 
particular, Deguchi brought with him another source of funds for the army – the mass 
folloǁiŶg Ōŵoto had iŶ JapaŶ gaǀe it seƌious fiŶaŶĐial ƌesouƌĐes, aŶd estiŵates of hoǁ 
much Deguchi took to Manchuria with him range between ¥200,000 and ¥300,000.45 To Lu, 
this presented the possibility of independence from Zhang Zuolin – without an alternative 
source of monetary support, the tensions evident in Lu and Zhang͛s ideas ŵight haǀe 
remained dormant as Lu was forced by economics to toe Zhang͛s liŶe. But ǁith a ĐoŵpetiŶg 
source of funding came a competing set of loyalties, and the challenge of serving two 
masters.  
Accounts differ about quite what happened to drive the wedge between Zhang and Lu – 
from late May into June, rumors of Lu betraying Zhang by making contact with the Zhili 
faction began to circulate, but there was also news of bandits running amok, and fingers 
pointed at Deguchi as a source of instability, including the suggestion that his increasingly 
outspoken preaching had led Zhang Zuolin to insert a spy amid the troops.46 
Whatever the cause, from that point things unraveled rapidly. Zhang announced that he was 
sending troops north to suppress the increase in bandit activity.47 Under fire from an 
unexpected direction and with his numbers dwindling by the day, Lu marched south to try 
                                                             
45 Estimates include: ¥230,000 (Gojū, ͞Yuŵe No Mōko Ōkoku͟. p.129), ¥250,000 (Nadolski, ͞The Socio-Political 
BaĐkgƌouŶd of the Ōŵoto “uppƌessioŶs͟. p.126), ¥260,000 (Yomiuri Shimbun, July 19th 1924), and ¥280,000 
(in both Eiji Deguchi, DeguĐhi Eiji SeŶshū, (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1979), p.116 and Masa (ed.) Nishikawa, Shisō 
KeŶkyū Shiryō; Voluŵe 66, Kōdō Ōŵotokyō JikeŶ Ni KaŶsuru KeŶkyū, ;KǇoto: TōǇō BuŶka, ϭϵϳϳͿ, p.276). This 
last Đoŵes fƌoŵ a tƌaŶsĐƌipt of aŶ iŶteƌǀieǁ ǁith OŶisaďuƌō himself. 
46 For the most part, the consular accounts focus on the Chinese/Mongolian strategic elements of the 
eǆpeditioŶ, aŶd stƌess the ďaŶditƌǇ oƌ Lu͛s allegiaŶĐe as reasons for the split, whereas the Japanese press was 
ŵoƌe iŶteƌested iŶ DeguĐhi͛s pƌeseŶĐe aŶd the iŵpaĐt of his pƌeaĐhiŶg. E.g. ͞OŶi Ŷo koŶkǇoĐhi he tōďatsutai 
shingunsu͟, Osaka Mainichi Shinbun, 21st June 1924; ͞OŶi Ŷo TeikǇo ǁo Waga ‘Ǉōji Ŷi YōkǇū͟, Tokyo 
Nichinichi Shinbun, 28th May 1924. 
47 Even here quite what happened is unclear: Lu is reported to have claimed that this was a ruse planned in 
advance to encourage further consolidation of the bandit groups under his umbrella (Ōŵoto NaŶajūŶeŶ Shi. 
p.744).  
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to meet and reach a rapprochement with Zhang. Lu initially sent some of the Japanese 
continental adventurers to mediate on his behalf, but when they failed to make progress he 
entered Liaotang (通辽) himself to seek a parlay.48 Zhang was in no mood for negotiations 
however – on the 21st of June, Lu and the 30 or so men he had taken with him were seized 
and shot, whilst Deguchi and the five other remaining Japanese were also taken into 
custody by Zhang Zuolin͛s ŵeŶ.49 According to some accounts, Deguchi and the other 
Japanese were rescued by consular officials only shortly before they were to be shot; 
regardless of whether this was hyperbole, or even a ploy to frighten the Japanese captives, a 
photo of them shows six bedraggled men, shackled at the ankles.50 From Manchuria, they 
were shipped back to Osaka to await trial.  
IŶterpretiŶg the NǇūŵō and Revisiting the ͞Paradox͟ of Pan-Asianism 
AĐĐoƌdiŶg to oďseƌǀeƌs, theŶ, the ŵissioŶ fell apaƌt ďeĐause of soŵe ĐoŵďiŶatioŶ of Lu͛s 
inability to ĐoŶtƌol the loĐal ďaŶdits he͛d ďeeŶ seŶt to Đoƌƌal, his oǁŶ iŶsuďoƌdiŶatioŶ, aŶd 
peƌhaps also DeguĐhi͛s pƌeseŶĐe spaƌkiŶg a gƌeateƌ degƌee of ǁillfulŶess ǁithiŶ Lu aŶd his 
suďoƌdiŶates. DeguĐhi͛s paƌt iŶ the stoƌǇ ǁas also ĐoŶtested – was he indeed the fly in the 
ointment or was he a dupe who had been taken advantage of (by both Lu and perhaps also 
the Japanese adventurers) due to his naivety, ͞a feeble-minded child [who] had 260 
thousand yen taken from his own pocket by bandits.͟51 
                                                             
48 Itō, Gss Vol.32. p.804 
49 Ibid. p.804 
50 E.g. Stalker, Prophet Motive. p.151 
51 ͞MoŶdai Ŷo hito: DeguĐhi OŶisaďuƌō͟, Yomiuri Shinbun, 23rd July 1924; ͞OŶi ǁa ϮϲŵaŶ͛eŶ Bō Ŷi Futta: “hiŶa 
‘ōŶiŶ Ŷi ‘iǇō saƌeta͟, Yomiuri Shinbun, 19th July 1924.  
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The ambiguity inherent in the mission evident as the events were occurring did not clear 
ǁith the passage of tiŵe. DeguĐhi͛s aĐĐouŶt, the oŶlǇ oŶe ǁhiĐh ǁas ǁƌitteŶ ďǇ paƌtiĐipaŶts 
in the expedition, unsurprisingly, portrays Deguchi himself in a more positive light than 
other accounts. The end of the mission is perhaps the most direct demonstration of this: 
Deguchi claimed to have met the firing squad with resolve, crying three Banzais for Japan 
aŶd thƌee foƌ Ōŵoto, ǁheƌe the pƌess ƌepoƌted hiŵ ĐƌǇiŶg ǁith ƌelief at the news that he 
was being transferred to Japanese consular jurisdiction.52  
Whilst there was much coverage in the daily newspapers, it was fragmentary day-by-day 
reporting, so did not amount to a sustained narrative of the mission. However, a rival 
account of the expedition did emerge in late 1924/early 1925. Stretching over three issues 
of the major monthly magazine Taiyō (太陽), ͞Yuŵe Ŷo Mōko Ōkoku͟ ;͞Mongolian Kingdom 
of Dreams͟, ʰ夢͹蒙古王国ʱ) elaborated a tale that was rich with ͞the excitement of 
detective fiction yet entirely real͟, exploring the multiple perspectives of Deguchi, Lu, Zhang 
Zuolin, and the Japanese nationalists.53 Who was behind the article is unclear: it was written 
uŶdeƌ the pseudoŶǇŵ Gojū TōjiŶ (五重塔人, ͞Fiǀe “toƌǇ Pagoda͟Ϳ, but the author claimed 
both a fascination with Deguchi born of a chance meeting two years before and expert 
knowledge of Fengtian and parts of Inner Mongolia, including the site where Lu was shot. 
The article characterizes Deguchi as a complex individual: casting him in a romantic light, 
but also mocking him by comparing his adventures to those of Don Quixote, stressing the 
                                                             
52 ͞Kuromaku ha Yobi-Taisa͟, Osaka Mainichi Shinbun, 2nd July 1924; Deguchi, Deguchi Onisaburō ZeŶshū Vol.6, 
pp.240-244 
53 Gojū, ͞Yuŵe No Mōko Ōkoku͟. pt.1 p.124 
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incongruity of his luxurious life in Japan put next to the hardships he underwent in 
Mongolia, and highlighting the megalomania of some of his claims to religious identity. 
At a time when Japanese interests in Manchuria were continuing to develop, and hence the 
everyday transnational, multi ethnic reality of life on the continent was projecting its 
influence back to mainland Japan via growing levels of trade and individual travel, the article 
can be seen as more than just the retelling of an adventure story. Rather it is an exploration 
of the growing connections between Japan and Manchuria – the presence of Japanese in 
Manchuria, but also the proximity of events on the continent to everyday domestic 
Japanese life.  Whilst the railway lines were at the heart of development in Manchuria, and 
hence the ͞railway territory͟ – the thin strip of land along the railway lines, and the towns it 
connected – were the core of these ͞colonial realities͟, even the very desolate and alien 
frontier into which Deguchi had ventured were integrally connected to Japan through its 
expanding presence in regional affairs and increasing economic expansion. 
Between Deguchi, Japanese officials, the daily press and Taiyō͛s iŶ-depth investigation, a 
range of interpretations emerged, stressing variously Deguchi͛s oǁŶ self-aggrandizement, 
the stƌategiĐ diŵeŶsioŶs of ďaŶdits aŶd aƌŵies iŶ ChiŶa, the sĐaŶdal aŶd gossip of DeguĐhi͛s 
fall, and even the developing relationships between Chinese and Japanese, Manchuria and 
homeland Japan. Together they map the differeŶt eleŵeŶts of the NǇūŵō ĐoalitioŶ aŶd 
represent a mirror to the range of motivations explored in the first sections of this article.  
There is, however, one final account to consider, one which emerged fully 12 years after the 
events had come to a conclusion. It came, in 1936, as a part of the KokuƌǇūkai͛s histoƌǇ of 
activities in continental Asia. Entitled Tōa SeŶkaku Shishi Kiden (東亜先覚志士記伝, ͞A 
Record of the Pioneering Heroes of East Asia͟Ϳ, this text looked a long sweep of Japanese 
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involvement in China and North-East Asia, seeking to place the 1931 Manchurian incident 
iŶto a ďƌoadeƌ Ŷaƌƌatiǀe of stƌuggles foƌ AsiaŶ iŶdepeŶdeŶĐe aŶd deǀelopŵeŶt. DeguĐhi͛s 
expedition was included alongside SueŶaga Misao͛s Chokokukai pƌojeĐt aŶd Lu͛s pƌioƌ 
attempts to free Inner Mongolia, and described as ͞an attempt to peacefully establish a 
Mongolian kingdom and realize an Asian league.͟54  
By the mid-ϭϵϯϬs the oǀeƌlap ďetǁeeŶ Ōŵoto ďelieǀeƌs aŶd the ŶatioŶalist groups which 
helped pƌoŵpt the NǇūŵō had deǀeloped iŶto a Đlose ƌelatioŶship ďetǁeeŶ DeguĐhi hiŵself 
and the leaders of some of the key associations, suĐh as TōǇaŵa Mitsuƌu aŶd UĐhida 
‘Ǉōhei.55 This marked what has been seen as a ͞patriotic turn͟ away froŵ Ōŵoto͛s  
internationalist phase in the 1920s, although as I will explore later in this article, this 
chronology is open to criticism. Nancy Stalker links the transition to DeguĐhi͛s 
entrepreneurial sense and ability to reposition the religion to better reflect the prevailing 
sentiment in Japanese society.56 These connections led the state to a second intervention in 
the ƌeligioŶ, this tiŵe aĐtiŶg ŵoƌe fiŶallǇ to pƌeǀeŶt Ōŵoto͛s aĐtiǀitǇ aŶd holdiŶg DeguĐhi 
more successfully.57  
By the mid 1930s, of course, JapaŶ͛s ƌelatioŶship ǁith ChiŶa had changed and intensified. 
The KokuƌǇūkai histoƌǇ ǁas puďlished a Ǉeaƌ ďefoƌe ǁaƌ ďƌoke out ďetǁeeŶ the tǁo ŶatioŶ-
states, whilst the range of possibilities offered by Pan-Asianism changed, too, narrowing 
until it eventually became no more than a hollow justification of the war effort expanding 
across Asia and the Pacific Ocean.  
                                                             
54 KokuƌǇūkai ;ed.Ϳ, Tōa SeŶkaku Shishi KideŶ, (Tokyo, 1936), p.28 
55 Nadolski, ͞The Socio-PolitiĐal BaĐkgƌouŶd of the Ōŵoto “uppressions͟. p.165, pp.199-201, p.227 
56 Stalker, Prophet Motive.  
57 According to Thomas Nadolski, Deguchi was quite plausibly tied to one of the attempted coups during the 
early 1930s (Nadolski, ͞The Socio-PolitiĐal BaĐkgƌouŶd of the Ōŵoto “uppƌessioŶs͟. pp.199-201) 
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A central question, therefore, about 1920s Pan-Asianism is whether this reduction of the 
ideology into a justification for Japanese aggression was inevitable – was the reality of Pan-
Asianism the triumph of Japanese national interest over Asian collaboration, or were other 
possible outcomes embedded within it? The purpose of this article has been to argue that 
the Mongolian expedition, as an example of Pan-Asianism in action, represents an 
alternative perspective on the tensions inherent within Pan-Asianism, and hence a chance 
to develop new understandings of them.  
Historians have looked to various methods to analyze the internal dynamics of Pan-
Asianism. For Marius Jansen, it was a shared antipathy to the West which allowed the 
formation of an unlikely coalition of non-Japanese Asians (such Sun Yat-Sen) and a range of 
Japanese patriots, liberals and democrats.58 Other scholars have sought to segment the 
space of Pan-Asianism in various ways. So, for example, Miwa Kimitada identifies a split 
between Pan-Asianisms based upon the identification of Western superiority (hence arguing 
for Asian unity) and those based upon Japanese strength (thus looking more towards 
Japanese leadership).59 Eri Hotta, by contrast, identifies a nested sequence of forms, from 
the identification of cultural affinity ;͞teaism͟Ϳ, to proposals for political alliance, to the 
identification of Japan as savior. This structure effectively forms a map between chronology 
and the sphere of operation, arguing that as time passed, the dominant form of Pan-
Asianism changed, and shifted the sphere in which it manifested, from culture, to politics, to 
the military.60 
                                                             
58 Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat-Sen. pp.4-5 
59 Miwa, ͞Pan-Asianism in Modern Japan͟. p.21 
60 Hotta, Pan-Asianism and Japan's War 1931-1945., chapter 1. 
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The conventional periodization of the histoƌǇ of Ōŵoto-kǇō ĐoŶfƌoŶts a siŵilaƌ pƌoďleŵ aŶd 
uses a similar strategy of segmentation. As discussed, the period of about 15 years between 
the first state suppression (1921) and the second, more final one (1935) is typically divided 
into two periods: an ͞international͟ phase, in which Deguchi pushed the religion towards 
the syncretic ties with other religions in Asia and Europe, followed by a ͞patriotic͟ phase in 
which he drew close to some of the nationalist groups agitating for a ͞“hōǁa IshiŶ͟ (昭和維
新).61 Close sĐƌutiŶǇ of the NǇūŵō, hoǁeǀeƌ, ƌeǀeals this periodization as quite problematic. 
It took place at the high point of the international phase but it grew out of ties between 
Ōŵoto aŶd the ĐoŶtiŶeŶtal adǀeŶtuƌeƌs, aŶd ƌeǀealed DeguĐhi as suƌpƌisiŶglǇ Đoŵfoƌtaďle 
with military power for someone often described as a pacifist.62 The inconvenient reality is 
that Ōŵoto͛s ties to ŶatioŶalists aŶd the ŵilitaƌǇ loŶg pƌedated the MaŶĐhuƌian Incident, 
ǁhilst the iŶteƌŶatioŶalist aĐtiǀitǇ ĐoŶtiŶued eǀeŶ afteƌ the ƌeligioŶ͛s patƌiotiĐ tuƌŶ.63 Whilst 
this periodization identifies diffeƌeŶt aspeĐts of DeguĐhi aŶd Ōŵoto͛s philosophǇ, 
disaggregating them into distinct phases is too simplistic.   
This complex relationship between nationalist and internationalist impulses prompts one 
final interpretive strategy for historical consideration of Japanese Pan-Asianism in the 1920s 
and 30s: the suggestion that it was ͞contradictory͟ 64 or even ͞paradoxical͟.65 Whilst fully 
recognizing and acknowledging the interpretive difficulties that give rise to this 
characterization, I am somewhat cautious about the use of the terms. It seems to me that 
                                                             
61 See Nadolski, ͞The Socio-PolitiĐal BaĐkgƌouŶd of the Ōŵoto “uppƌessioŶs͟, or Stalker, Prophet Motive for 
periodization.  
62 Narangoa, ͞The Vision of Omotokyo͟. p.54-55 
63 Nancy Stalker alludes to this categorical complexity by labelling the first phase as ͞paradoxical 
internationalism͟ (Stalker, Prophet Motive. Chapter 5).  
64 Szpilman, ͞Between Pan-Asianism and Nationalism͟. p.85 
65 Savitri Vishwanathan, ͞Paradox of Japan's Nationalism: Relations with Asia͟, Journal of Asian and African 
Studies, 10 (3-4) (1975). 
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there is a risk of anachronism or teleology in using them: that is, I think we should seriously 
consider the possibility that we only identify a paradox at the heart of 1920s Pan-Asianism 
because of what we know about the ͞dark valley of Showa͟ aŶd JapaŶ͛s desĐeŶt iŶto ǁaƌ 
which followed. Rather than prefigure the 1930s by marking interwar Pan-Asianism as 
inherently contradictory, I would prefer to examine these internal tensions in their own 
terms, and seek to understand how they were recognized and reconciled in at the time. 
In this light, this article proposes a new way of examining the diversity inherent within Pan-
Asianism, one which neither denies the tension between different forms, nor seeks to 
reduce it to a ͞paradox͟. BǇ eǆaŵiŶiŶg the Đoŵpleǆ of ŵotiǀes ǁhiĐh got the NǇūŵō off the 
ground, how they struggled to coexist, and then the different interpretations and meanings 
which were projected onto events after their conclusion, I have sought to use a 
transnational method which overlays the different readings of the mission without 
privileging one over another, or arguing for a single correct understanding. This polyvocal 
approach requires the use of a diverse set of sources drawing on different perspectives, and 
it forces us as historians to recognize that we cannot come to a final conclusion about what 
exactly happened on the steppe of Inner Mongolia to bring the mission crashing down. 
However, by doing this, I believe that we can gain access to an understanding of the 
dynamics of different elements within Pan-Asianism in action that more top-down 
approaches cannot. This micro history of practical Pan-Asianism demonstrates the activities 
of coalition forming and execution, and the ways in which the stresses within the different 
participants͛ different visions represent a microcosm of wider Asian and Pan-Asian 
ideologies.  
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Conclusion  
DeguĐhi OŶisaďuƌō escaped the fate of his partner Lu Zhankui, but in being shipped back to 
Japan he nevertheless faced the likelihood of severe official sanction. His trial for lèse-
majesté had commenced in his absence, both prompted and compounded by his flight. 
After being found guilty, he was sentenced to 5 years of hard labour; however, he was 
released after 4 months on parole, and indeed was fully pardoned in 1927 as a part of a 
geŶeƌal aŵŶestǇ tied to the death of the Taishō eŵpeƌoƌ.66 Although Deguchi never 
ƌetuƌŶed to MaŶĐhuƌia, Ōŵoto ƌeŵaiŶed aĐtiǀe iŶ the ƌegioŶ, eǀeŶ as ǁaƌ spƌead across the 
continent.67 
It is hard to trace any lasting effects of the Mongolian expedition iŶ ChiŶa eitheƌ: it doesŶ͛t 
seem to have had a dramatic impact in the second Zhili-Fengtian war, which broke out in 
late 1924 despite Zhang͛s iŶaďilitǇ to shoƌe up the Mongolian flank. Nevertheless, as 
demonstrated in this article, it was an important event, not for its longer term 
consequences, but rather for what it tells us about Pan-Asian movements in the 1920s, the 
complex intellectual, political and social coalitions which formed around ideas of Asian 
unity, and the tensions which lay inherent within them. From brokered beginning to 
ĐoŶtested afteƌŵath, the NǇūŵō was an example of how Japanese, Chinese, and 
Mongolians came together in the borderlands of Manchuria-Mongolia.  
To elucidate these connections, the article adopts what I have termed a transnational 
method: explicitly recognizing the event as a confluence of participants and motives, and 
therefore seeking to enumerate these in their multiplicity, rather than adopt a single 
                                                             
66 Sheldon Garon, Moulding Japanese Minds: The State in Everyday Life, Princeton University Press, 1998, p.74 
67 Stalker, Prophet Motive, p.163-164 
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dominant frame. There are difficulties to this polyphonic approach – the Japanese 
perspectives are better documented and so it is hard to avoid privileging them over the 
Chinese perspectives (especially those of Lu Zhankui and others who did not survive the 
expedition). However, I believe that the method pays dividends. In particular, the structure 
of this paper is intended to suggest connections between the different levels at which we 
can look at the mission: multiple motives produced multiple ways of seeing the unfolding of 
events, which in turn led to multiple interpretations and even multiple possible 
historiographies. Remaining aware of these layered spectra is a corrective to the risk of 
focusing on one, partial historiographical interpretation.  
The other key argument that this article aims to advance is that there are also insights to be 
gained from looking at an example of Pan-Asianism in practice, rather than Pan-Asianism as 
idea. Again, there are difficulties to be faced in seeking to read meaning into sets of events 
rather than political or philosophical texts. However I believe again that there are 
historiographical consequences: highlighting the need for a greater understanding of the 
role of the continental adventurers as agents at the fringes of Japanese influence, 
recognizing the direct connections between Japanese imperial and domestic affairs, and 
challenging straightforward models of the relationship between ideas of Pan-Asianism, 
nationalisms and internationalisms, with implications for our conventional categories and 
chronologies.  
Examining how people put their ideas of Asian unity into actual practice on the ground 
represents an opportunity to expand how we understand the possibilities, tensions, and 
challenges faced by the ideology. Moreover, by retaining awareness of the different 
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perspectives on a single event we can remain alert to the multiple readings that are 
embedded within it.  
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